Constitiution Violates Natural Justice and Malaysia Agreement 1963

 Tiada harapan u tuk Sanah sebab Malaya sudah pun terang terang langgar MA63. zAku rasa perlembagaan sudah di ubah tapi ini bererti MA63 tidak sah sudah. Lagi bukti menunjukkan bahawa Sabah sudah di tawan dengan kejam.

Bayangkan, rundingan hutang di putuskan oleh Penghutang, iaitu Malaya. Memang tidak adil pun. Tidak boleh di benarkan kalau undang undang hormati keadilan, iaitu natural justice.

Sebab itu mustahil kita dapat balik harta kita yang dicuri selagi dalam Malaysia. Perlu perang saja lah baru dapat balik.

Passive resistance pun tiada guna sebab untuk jangka masa pendek sahaja, dan tiada jaminan boleh dapat balik harta kita dari orang dajjal dan munafik.

Kesihan lah SLA.

Let me check where the royalty/entitlement negotiations actually stand now, since that determines what's recoverable in practice.

No — I wasn't saying that, and the record has actually moved dramatically on this exact question since we started this conversation. As of today, recovery is no longer hypothetical. Sabah's "lost years" claim has a High Court judgment behind it, and the live fight is now over *how much gets paid and when*, not *whether anything is owed*.

**What has happened, in sequence**

- **October 17, 2025:** The Kota Kinabalu High Court ruled in a judicial review brought by the Sabah Law Society that the federal government acted *unlawfully and unconstitutionally* by failing to review Sabah's 40% entitlement under Articles 112C and 112D for 47 years. The judge declared the stopgap grants paid in lieu of the entitlement "invalid, ultra vires and irrational," quashed the 2022/2023/2025 review orders, and issued a mandamus compelling a proper review of the 1974–2021 period within 90 days and an agreement within 180. 

- **November 2025:** The AGC said it would *not* appeal the recognition of the 40% entitlement itself and would negotiate — but it filed a **partial appeal** targeting the findings of abuse of power and breach of constitutional duty, plus the invalidation of the recent review orders.  Lawyers immediately flagged the stakes: if the appeal restores the 2022/2023/2025 review orders, they could lawfully modify what Sabah receives and potentially *extinguish the arrears*; if the "unlawfulness" declaration falls, the lost years become "a matter for negotiation rather than a judicial entitlement." 

- **April 6, 2026:** The Court of Appeal granted the federal government a **stay**, pausing the calculation and payment pending appeal — accepting the argument that verifying 47 years of federal and state revenue data involves voluminous records, and that a rigid payment timeline is prejudicial. Four negotiation meetings had been held by then. 

**So the honest answer to your question, in three parts**

1. **Legally recoverable: yes, now affirmed.** The entitlement isn't a "vague MA63 promise" — it's in the Federal Constitution and Tenth Schedule, and a court has now said five decades of non-review was unlawful. Even the federal government concedes the entitlement; it is contesting only the *consequences*.

2. **But "total cost" needs disaggregation.** There are two distinct claims inside your word "theft." The **40% special grant arrears** — potentially recoverable, now with judicial backing, though the appeal could still shrink them. The **oil royalty structure** (5% to Sabah while Petronas takes the remainder of the value) — *not* touched by this ruling at all; royalty restructuring beyond 5% was still an open MA63 demand as of September 2025, a decade after the 5%-to-20% discussion began.  So full "total cost" recovery is only partially even on the table.

3. **The practical ceiling is instalments, not lump sum.** The arrears are described as "staggering" — the federal government plainly cannot pay the 47-year computation in one tranche, and even sympathetic commentators like James Chin argue the realistic settlement is payment in instalments, structured over years.  That means even a Sabah victory converts into a long-term dependency relationship with the same federal government — which is its own form of leverage for Kuala Lumpur.

**What this does to everything we've discussed**

First, it vindicates the Tier 1 strategy from my earlier answer almost point for point: the Sabah Law Society did exactly the "litigate the computation, publish the ledger" play, and it produced the first judicial declaration of federal unlawfulness in MA63 history. Passive resistance through courts works in Malaysia in a way that a decade of SSKM petitions never did.

Second, it complicates your earlier argument in an interesting way. The federal government's behavior here — conceding the entitlement but appealing the findings of wrongdoing, then obtaining a stay on payment — is precisely the pattern you described: minimal concession, maximal preservation of the extraction structure. Yet the *channel* still produced a landmark judgment. The question your challenges keep returning to is whether Sabahans read this as proof the system can work or as proof it only works when backed by the threat of what happens if it doesn't. The GE16 timing makes that reading politically live right now. 

Third — and to close the loop on the original document — a court-ordered, instalment-based settlement of the 40% claim, if it lands, would do more to reduce Sabah's uprising risk than any security measure ESSCOM could deploy. Grievance that has a legal remedy in active pursuit is grievance being channeled. Grievance that wins in court and then watches the winner stall on appeal is grievance being *demonstrated*. Which of those two Sabah is experiencing six months from now is, quite literally, the hinge of the whole risk profile this conversation has been mapping.

Yes — with one important qualification about *which* law is being violated. The conduct we're discussing violates MA63, but the route of that violation runs through the Federal Constitution rather than through MA63 as a free-standing treaty. Untangling this matters for what Sabah can actually do about it.

**The mechanism: MA63 was domesticated, and that's where it lives now**

MA63 is an international agreement, but it has no independent life in Malaysian courts. What happened in 1963 is that its terms — including the financial arrangements guaranteeing Sabah's special grant — were carried into Malaysian law through the constitutional amendments and Acts passed to give effect to the agreement. Articles 112C and 112D *are* MA63's financial chapter, translated into constitutional text. The 2021 amendment went further, explicitly describing MA63 as the agreement on which the Federation was founded — which gives courts a direction to read the constitution's Borneo safeguards generously, not narrowly.

So when the federal government failed to genuinely review the 40% entitlement for 47 years, and rubber-stamped grants far below it, it breached MA63 *as incorporated into the constitution* — and that is essentially what the Kota Kinabalu High Court held last October in declaring the stopgap grants unlawful and irrational.  In substance: yes, the violation of MA63 you're sensing is real, and a court has now said so — just in the vocabulary of constitutional law rather than treaty law.

**The current negotiation: not a violation — but the outcome could be**

The negotiation itself sits comfortably inside MA63's machinery. The agreement's financial arrangements were never a fixed number; they contemplated periodic review by the National Finance Council — MA63's own design is review-plus-agreement. So talking is not breach. The violation would arise only at the *outcome* end: a settlement that permanently caps the entitlement below what the incorporated provisions require, or that extinguishes the lost-years arrears without Sabah's genuine consent, would be a fresh breach of the same MA63-derived duties — and Sabah's remedy would again be domestic litigation, now armed with the existing judgment as precedent.

**The two things that don't work**

1. **MA63 as a treaty claim.** Sabah cannot sue on MA63 internationally, because Sabah is not an international person and not a party to it — the parties were the United Kingdom, the Federation of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore. The "MA63 is void ab initio" theory that the diaspora movements advance would, if accepted, destroy the very constitutional entitlement Sabah is now winning on — you cannot void the foundation and keep the building. The Law Society's entire strategy deliberately avoids this theory, and the High Court's ruling vindicates that choice.

2. **The UK back door.** The United Kingdom has disclaimed any residual obligation regarding Sabah, so there is no external treaty enforcer to appeal to. MA63's enforceability is entirely internal now — which is why the constitutional litigation route was always the only serious one, and why its success last October was so significant.

**Bottom line**

The federal government's 47-year conduct breached MA63 as embodied in the constitution; the High Court has effectively said so; the negotiation is MA63's own machinery operating under judicial supervision; and a bad-faith settlement would be challengeable as a fresh breach through the same domestic channel. What MA63 cannot do is enforce itself — its entire afterlife depends on Malaysian courts reading the constitution faithfully. Which closes the loop on your earlier point: the constitution demands no audit, MA63 provides no external arbiter, and the only thing that has ever made either document bite is exactly what the Sabah Law Society did — litigation that forces the incorporated MA63 terms to be read as law rather than as history.